Beijing's Missile Move in South China Sea Could Make US Think Twice About Getting Too Close

Satellite imagery, confirmed today by US and Taiwanese officials, appears to show two batteries of HQ-9 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers on Woody Island, a Chinese occupied feature in Paracel Islands, in the South China Sea.

The HQ-9 is a Chinese-made mobile air defence system, comparable to Russia’s S-300 SAM, with a reported range of 125 miles.

It is not clear whether this is a temporary detachment or an open-ended deployment, which would require more supporting infrastructure than has yet been observed on Woody Island. However, assuming the HQ-9 becomes operational it would provide coverage for Woody Island and the whole Paracel group, as well as the southern approaches to Hainan island, where China’s main South China Sea naval bases are located.

Beginning last November, China began deploying J-11 fighters on detachment to Woody Island. So, from a military point of view, it should come as no surprise that China has chosen Woody island to project its air defence further out into the South China Sea.

This marks a step up the ladder to China’s progressive “militarisation” of the South China Sea, but it is also calibrated. If China’s long-term strategy seeks military pre-dominance in the South China Sea, one near-term motivation for the missile deployment could be to deter the US from mounting an overflight operation close to the Paracel Islands.

The most recent US freedom of navigation operation (FONOP), in late January, was conducted at the outer Paracels’ edge, at some distance from Woody Island. The US Navy achieved a degree of surprise that time which will be difficult to repeat, by surface or air.

Such are the risks for China, it is improbable that Chinese forces would engage an approaching US aircraft in peacetime. But the added risk of having to deal with a Chinese SAM system may lead the US to think twice about overflight operations in the area.

This is no “missile crisis” in the Cuban sense therefore. Rather what we are seeing is a conscious effort by China to progressively extend its strategic footprint in the South China Sea.

When President Xi gave a vague undertaking in Washington last September that China “does not intend to pursue militarization” he was referring to the Spratly Islands.

China may therefore feel more confident in pressing ahead with the air defence of the Paracels. It is also a way of testing international reaction as a potential precursor to the militarisation of its artificial structures in the Spratlys, or the even declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

When China’s naval chief spoke recently with his US counterpart, he left the door ajar to the militarisation of the Spratlys, saying that the extent of China’s “defences completely depends on the level of threat we face”.

This may be the military next step, which the US Navy is already anticipating. Earlier this week, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, warned that a move by China to start flying jet fighters from its man-made islands in the Spratlys would be destabilizing, and would not deter the US from continuing to fly in international airspace over the South China Sea.

In a political context, China’s latest move in the Paracels coincides with the Sunnylands summit for ASEAN leaders being hosted by President Obama. The appearance of the HQ-9 missiles could be interpreted as a warning to Southeast Asian leaders not to tack too close to the US in the South China Sea.

It will also have tested Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop’s mettle when she met today with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing. Ms Bishop said last October that Australia and the US will hold China to President Xi’s statement on militarising the Spratly Islands. That may be put to the test sooner than expected.

SOURCE: The Guardian